Surface Use and Damages Statutes:  \u3ci\u3eCloud\u3c/i\u3e ed Constitutionality by Graus, Stacey L.
Journal of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Law 
Volume 6 
Issue 1 Journal of Mineral Law & Policy, volume 
6, issue 1 
Article 5 
January 1990 
Surface Use and Damages Statutes: "Cloud"ed Constitutionality 
Stacey L. Graus 
University of Kentucky 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Graus, Stacey L. (1990) "Surface Use and Damages Statutes: "Cloud"ed Constitutionality," Journal of 
Natural Resources & Environmental Law: Vol. 6 : Iss. 1 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel/vol6/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For 
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
Surface Use and Damages Statutes:
"Cloud"ed Constitutionality
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the surface estate has been servient to the
dominant mineral estate.' Courts have generally acknowledged
this dominance when rendering decisions on disputes between
the surface estate owner and the mineral developer. 2 The recent
emergence of the "accommodation doctrine" 3 has led the courts
to take a less one-sided position in disputes between the surface
and mineral estate owners. Legislators have taken this judicial
cue and enacted legislation to provide an equitable solution to
surface disputes.
Surface damage statutes4 have evolved to balance the com-
peting interests of the surface and mineral estate owners. These
statutes have a threefold purpose: (1) to minimize the harm
suffered by the surface estate owners, (2) to prevent potential
loss of the surface which may harm the general public by de-
pleting available land for agricultural or other beneficial use,
I Pearce, Surface Damages And The Oil And Gas Operator in North Dakota, 58
N.D. L. REv. 457, 469 (Fall 1982).
2 Uniform Law Commissioners' Uniform Surface Use and Damages Act, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Draft from Meeting at Kauia,
Hawaii, Prefatory Note (July 28-August 4, 1989) [hereinafter Draft); see generally Zillman
and Tyler, The Common Law of Access and Surface Use in Mining, J. Mn . L. & PoL'y
267 (1986).
1 Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Surface Use and Damages Act [hereinafter
Act], National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Current Draft, 4
(October 4, 1,989) (The Commissioners considered this Draft for approval in the summer
of 1990). Mineral developers "may not preclude or impair an existing surface use where
they can fully enjoy their own rights without injury to the surface owner's use; where
industry practice shows that alternatives are available to the mineral owner of developer;
and where surace uses can be respected without unreasonable interference with devel-
opment activity." See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971); Getty
Oil Co. v. Royal, 422 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Flying Diamond Corp. v.
Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976).
4 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-10-501 to -511 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-11.1-
01 to .10 (1980); Omj.A. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 318.2-318.9 (Supp. 1983); S.D. CoDIED LAws
ANN. §§ 45-5A-1 to -11 (1983); W. VA. CODE §§ 22-4C-1 to -9 (Supp. 1984); [hereinafter
Statutes].
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and (3) to prevent unsettled disputes between surface and mineral
estate owners from unduly affecting the mineral development
itself.5
Mineral developers have not welcomed these statutes. They
have sought to retain the advantages traditionally enjoyed by
attacking these statutes on constitutional grounds. Challengers
of the statutes argue that the imposition of strict liability for
surface damage results in an unconstitutional taking of private
property without just compensation. 6 The developers also con-
tend that application of these statutes constitutes a substantial
impairment of the obligations of contracts.7 Two courts have
already addressed the constitutional issues which confront the
validity of the surface damage statutes.
In Davis Oil Co. v. Cloud" the Oklahoma Supreme Court
found that this type of legislation was "a proper exercise of the
state's police power as it protected against waste of natural
resources and protected the rights of owners of those resources
against infringement by others." 9 However, the Cloud ruling, as
the dissent points out, 0 did not adequately respond to the con-
stitutional questions surrounding these statutes, thus providing
no guidance to drafters of future legislation. Therefore, prior to
approving a Model Surface Use and Damages Act [hereinafter
Act]," the National Conference of Commissioners' on Uniform
State Laws should consider the constitutional impediments to
such legislation.
The Act's drafters assert that, based on a state's police power
to regulate land usage, statutes enacted in accordance with the
Act should withstand constitutional attacks.' 2 Apparently per-
suaded by this argument, the Cloud court upheld the Oklahoma
surface damage statute as a lawful exertion of the state's police
I Draft, supra note 2, at 2.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 17-70 for discussion of this argument.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 71-94 for discussion of this argument.
I Davis Oil Co. v. Cloud, 766 P.2d 1347, 1353 (Okla. 1986) (Summers, J.,
dissenting).
9 Id. at 1351 (Mineral lessee challenged the constitutionality of the Oklahoma
surface damages statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 318.2-318.9. The court upheld the
statute on the grounds that this was a valid exercise of the state's police power as derived
from the Federal Constitution).
10 Id. at 1353.
Act, supra note 3.
Id. at 2-3.
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power to protect the vital agricultural industry within the state. 3
However, the difficult constitutional challenges facing surface
damage statutes were not carefully scrutinized. Therefore courts
confronted with the same issues will have to look beyond Cloud
4
for precedential guidance. An analysis based on the United States
Supreme Court's examination of Takings Clause" and Contracts
Clause 6 issues is helpful in determining the constitutionality of
surface mining statutes.
I. TAKINGS CLAUSE CHALLENGE
A. Fifth Amendment Application to States Through Fourteenth
Amendment
The Cloud court 7 eschewed the constitutional attack under
the Takings Clause 8 by ruling that state legislators may regulate
and restrict land use to protect the land from waste and to
prevent impairment of the rights of others. Quoting from An-
derson-Prichard Oil Corp. v. Corporation Commission, 9 the
court states, "[S]uch legislation does not infringe the constitu-
tional inhibitions against the taking of property without due
process of law, denial of equal protection of the laws, or taking
property without just compensation." 2 Property rights are sub-
ject to regulation through the state's police power, but if the
state's action "reaches a certain magnitude ... there must be
an exercise of the power of eminent domain and compensation
to sustain the act." ' 2' The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that
1, Cloud, 766 P.2d at 1351 (to ensure that the development of one industry is not
undertaken at the expense of another when the vitality of both agricultural and oil and
gas segments are already suffering).
14 Cloud, 766 P.2d at 1347.
" U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No state shall ... pass any ... law impairing
the obligation of contracts").
" Cloud, 766 P.2d at 1347.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
" 241 P.2d 363, 372 (Okla. 1951), app. dismissed 342 U.S. 938, (quoting Lombardo
v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 475, 1934)).
Cloud, 766 P.2d at 1351.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (bill in equity
brought to restrain coal company from mining under plaintiff's property in such a
manner as to remove the supports and cause subsidence of the surface and plaintiff's
house).
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the statute at issue in Cloud represented a legislative action which
was permissibly designed to protect the state's resources.2 Op-
ponents contend that the statute allows Oklahoma to deprive a
mineral developer of his private property interest without due
process of the law.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment '2 has
a dual function. It affords procedural safeguards to protect life,
liberty, and property interests, but it also protects those rights
against impermissible governmental restrictions. The Fifth
Amendment provides that private property cannot be taken with-
out just compensation.2 The Framers of the Constitution also
intended it to keep the government from requiring a few to bear
the weight of restrictive legislation rather than spreading the
consequences among the public. "1
Fairness and justice dictate that the government not affect
property rights without a legitimate state interest. Legislation
affecting property rights must be analyzed by weighing the bur-
den on individual property interests against the anticipated gain
to society.
B. Government Regulation of Private Property: Enterprise and
Arbitral Capacity
Government interference with the use of private property
occurs either in an enterprise capacity26 or an arbitral capacity. 27
When acting in an enterprise capacity, the government procures
private resources for the use of the common good. Alternatively,
acting in an arbitral capacity, the government intervenes in areas
concerning property rights where competing interests have caused
disputes. The government is acting in its arbitral capacity when
it steps in to resolve disputes involving surface estate owners and
mineral developers.2 When the state acts in its arbitral capacity
- Cloud, 766 P.2d at 1351.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
2, U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictij, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987)
(various coal companies brought action challenging the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act
which requires that 50 percent of the coal beneath certain structures be kept in place to
provide surface support).
See Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62 (1964).
' Id. at 63.
"Id.
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it must show that the statute it is operating under is a noncom-
pensable regulation of property rights.2 '
C. Regulatory Taking
Courts have recognized three types of takings. The first,
condemnation proceedings, demonstrates the government's ex-
ercise of its power of eminent domain.30 In the second type,
which also involves a physical taking, the government takes
private property through inverse condemnation.3 In the third
type, the government, through its regulatory power, affects the
use of private property to the extent that a taking has occurred
requiring that the owner be compensated.3 2 Surface damage sta-
tutes are evaluated under this third type of taking since there is
no physical annexation of property by the government.
The Supreme Court has employed two analytical approaches
to this type of regulatory taking.3 3 In Penn Central Transpor-
tation Co. v. New York City,34 the Court announced three
considerations to be examined in a Takings Clause35 challenge
based on an exercise of a state's regulatory power. The elements
are (1) the character of the governmental action; (2) the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation; and (3) the extent to which the
regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations of the
property owner.?
The Court has also provided an analysis which operates as
a two-part, disjunctive test. This analysis emerged from the
Court's holdings in Agins v. City Tiburon37 and Nollan v. Cal-
ifornia Coastal Commission.3 Under this approach, a taking is
Id.
0Housing Auth. of Cherokee Nat. of Okla. v. Langley, 555 P.2d 1025, 1028
(Okla. 1976) (The government may exercise its power of eminent domain to take private
property for public use).
"1 See Lincoln Loan Co. v. State, 536 P.2d 450, 451 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (where
the government has not undertaken or completed the formal exercise of the power of
eminent domain).
1 Viviano, The Takings Clause: A Protection to Private Rights in Federal Oil and
Gas Leases, 24 Tuxs L.J. 43, 49 (1988).
Id. at 50.
438 U.S. 104, (1978) (the Court discussed the impact of the regulation on the
plaintiff's ability to receive economic gain from the property).
U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
" Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 130-131.
" 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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deemed to occur if: (1) the regulation does not substantially
advance a legitimate state interest, or (2) if the regulation denies
landowners an economically viable use of their land.
3 9
The Cloud court did not analyze the statute according to
either of the above tests. The court merely relied on the state's
police power to alter existing common law principles. 40 The
Cloud ruling falls short of the critical examination applied by
the United States Supreme Court. The future validity of surface
damage statutes requires that they be examined according to the
tests promulgated by the Supreme Court.
4'
1. Penn Central Test
As noted earlier, the Penn Centra42 test includes three com-
ponents. The first inquiry involves the character of the govern-
ment action. The Supreme Court elaborated upon this factor in
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis.41 The Key-
stone court dealt with the validity of the Pennsylvania Subsi-
dence Act. The Act ensured surface support by preventing mineral
lessees from extracting more than 50% of the coal which lay
beneath certain structures." Upholding the statute's validity, the
Supreme Court viewed the regulation as furthering health and
environmental interests, two interests which benefit the general
public.45 Since surface damage statutes intend to safeguard health
and environmental interests, this will weigh in favor of their
validity. Thus the statutes should'pass the scrutiny of the first
Penn Central factor.
The second element of the Penn Central test concerns the
economic impact of the regulation.4 Applying the second com-
ponent of the test, a court must consider the economic impact
of denying a potential use. Further, a court must balance the
impact against the other two elements of this test.
The manner in which a court views a regulated property right
determines the impact on the use of the property. For example,
19 See Viviano, supra note 32, at 50.
- Cloud, 766 P.2d at 1347.
41 See Viviano, supra note 32.
,1 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 130-31.
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a court may not consider the loss of the right to sell certain
property as being so valuable as to constitute a taking.47 How-
ever, the same court may determine that restricting an owner's
right to devise property upon his death does constitute a taking.4
Surface damage statutes may cause a mineral developer to ex-
perience higher costs in the exploration of the mineral resources.
But, since many oil and gas lessees have already been paying
surface owners for damage to the surface, the regulation may
merely codify an industry wide custom. Oil and gas lessees have
paid these damages, without any legal obligation, to avoid dis-
putes and promote good community relations. 49 Thus, imposition
of statutory damages may not affect the price of the minerals
or the relations between the surface owners and mineral devel-
opers.
The third element of the Penn Central test concerns the
amount of interference with the investment-backed expectations
of the property owner." This factor considers the mineral de-
veloper's reliance on the mineral lease to ensure the uses contem-
plated when entering into the lease. Property owners must be
completely thwarted in their expectations of profit for this factor
to invalidate the regulation under the Takings Clause.5' A dim-
inution in expected profits will not serve as a basis for invali-
dating the pertinent statute. Surface damage statutes do not
prohibit mineral development nor do they substantially hinder
the expected return on the mineral developer's investment. Thus,
the statutes fair well when examined under the third factor of
the Penn Central test.
In applying the Penn Central test to surface damage statutes,
the courts are likely to uphold their validity against a Takings
Clause challenge. The statutes promote environmental, health,
and economic interests without restricting the mineral develo-
4' Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979) (Petitioner challenged the validity of
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Interior to prohibit commercial transactions
in the sale of certain birds legally killed before those birds came under protection of the
Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act).
4 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (designated heirs and devisees of three
deceased members of the Oglala Siouz Tribe alleged an unconstitutional taking of private
property because the Indian Land Consolidation Act authorized a seizure of property
without just compensation).
49 Lowe, Eastern Oil and Gas Operation: Do Recent Developments Suggest New
Answers to Old Problems?, MiN. INST. 20-1, 20-18 to 20-20 (1983).
10 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491.
11 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
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per's right to exploit the mineral resources.5 2 The statutes merely
condition that right upon the payment of surface damages.
2. Agins/Nollan Analysis
The Agins/Nollanll analysis is more favorable to the prop-
erty owner in light of a Takings Clause challenge. To prevail,
the property owner must show that the regulation will not ac-
complish a valid goal or that the regulation denies all "viable
use" of the property. In Nollan the Court raised the standard
as to what constitutes a legitimate state interest.54 It determined
that the regulation must substantially advance the police power
purpose served." At first blush this analysis may not appear
significantly different than the Penn Centra-' approach. How-
ever, the Nollan analysis places a greater burden on the state.
The state must prove the statute serves a legitimate state purpose,
since the statute affects private property rights and impinges on
a person's ability to contract freely.
57
In Nollan the Court held that the government's power to
forbid a particular land use to advance a legitimate police power
purpose includes the power to condition such use upon some
concession by the owner." The concession may affect property
rights as long as the condition furthers the state purpose intended
to be advanced by the regulation.
59
The Agins6° Court opinion provides an alternative to Nollan
under this disjunctive test. Agins stated that a taking does not
occur as long as the land use regulation "substantially advance[s]
legitimate state interests" and does not den[y] an owner econom-
ically viable use of his land." 61 The essential issues one must
address under the Agins/Nollane analysis are as follows: whether
See Draft, supra note 2, at 3.
Viviano, supra note 32, at 57.
1 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
I d.
, Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104.
I? Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (The analysis raises the standard of review for a
legitimate state purpose. The regulation on the property must substantially facilitate the
police power served).
a Id. at 831-37.
' Id.
0 Agins, 447 U.S. at 255.
6, Id. at 260.
SViviano, supra note 32, at 57.
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the regulation serves a legitimate state interest and whether the
property owner can still make use of his land in a manner to
benefit his economic interests.
The Supreme Court ruled that a regulation constitutes a
taking when it extends too far into the property rights of indi-
viduals. In Hodel v. Irving63 the Court determined that the
regulation was not so connected with the governmental purpose
as to allow a deprivation of a landowner's right to dispose of
his property by descent or devise."4 Although this regulation
represented a legitimate state purpose, it infringed on property
rights unrelated to the goal. The Supreme Court has recently
affirmed the courts' role in determining if a regulation promotes
a legitimate state interest. But that role is a narrow one.65 The
Supreme Court stated in Western & Southern Life Insurance
Company v. State Board of Equalization" that "whether in fact
the provision will accomplish its objectives is not the question:
the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied if ... the ... [state]
Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act] would
promote its objective."67
In Atlas Corp. v. U.S." the Supreme Court recently held
that "the government may regulate the use of land or a business
through its police power, i.e., for health and safety reasons,
even if such regulation causes the owner of such property to
spend additional revenue, without such regulation being found
a constitutional taking requiring compensation." 69 Thus, when
an economically viable use of the property exists after the reg-
ulation is imposed, the regulation will not constitute a taking.
"[Tihe denial of one traditional property right does not always
amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full
"bundle" of property rights, the destruction of one "strand" in
- 481 U.S. 704 (1987). See supra note 48.
" Id.
"3 Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648
(198 1).
451 U.S. 648 (1981).
'3 Id. at 671-72.
15 CI.Ct. 681 (1988) (Uranium producers attempted to recover costs expended
to stabilize uranium mill tailings. The producers felt slighted when the Uranium Mill
Tailings Radiation Control Act was passed forcing them to spend a large amount to
clean up hazardous tailings after they had contracted with the United States government
to mine the uranium to sell to the government).
Id., at 689.
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the "bundle" is not a taking, because the aggregate must be
viewed in its entirety.' '70
D. Legitimate State Interest Is a Legislative Question
Surface damage statutes intend to serve various purposes
related to state goals. The goals include the following: to enhance
agricultural production in those states where it is a major source
of revenue; to maintain an environmentally stable community;
and, to achieve quick resolutions to disputes between the surface
and mineral estate owners to ensure optimum development of
the mineral interests. 71 Courts give great deference to legislators
in their need to regulate for the common good. If there is a
rational basis for believing the regulation will promote legislative
goals and if the basis has a sufficient nexus to the achievement
of those goals, then the court will uphold the regulation. 72 Gov-
ernmental regulation involves the adjustment of individual rights
for the public good. Many times the regulation will curtail some
potential use or cut short an opportunity for economic exploi-
tation of private property. To require compensation in every
circumstance would compel the government to regulate by pur-
chase. 73 Surface damage statutes do not provide for an appro-
priation of property. They merely lessen the value of the property
due to a permissible regulatory measure imposed upon the use
of the property.
In Murphy v. Amoco Production Co., 74 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals reviewed the North Dakota surface damage
Statute 7 and assessed its constitutionality. The Amoco court
stated that an exercise of a state's police power is constitutional
unless it is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general
welfare" of that state.76 The court believed that the purpose of
70 Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66.
" Draft, supra note 2, at 2.
72 Troy Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287, 295-97 (1984) (The court's pronouncement
applied to the constitutional challenge under both the Takings Clause and the Contracts
Clause).
71 Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65 (The Court stated this policy succinctly since they
considered it a well-known exposition).
14 729 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1984).
11 N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-01 to -.10 (1980).
76 Amoco, 729 F.2d at 555 (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395
(1926)).
[VOL. 6:87
SURFACE USE AND DAMAGES STATUTss
the statute, to protect the state's agriculture and economic status,
was substantially related to the state's legitimate interests.7 The
court pointed out that surface damage statutes do not destroy
property rights; the statutes merely impose economic burdens on
the mineral developer.78 Apparently, legislators believe that the
mineral developer is in a better position to absorb the costs
resulting from damage to the surface estate.
II. CONTRACTS CLAUSE CHALLENGE
A. Introduction
The Contracts Clause provides that "[n]o State shall ...
pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. '" A
strict reading of this clause would render unconstitutional any
infringement on a legally executed contract, regardless of the
purpose for the infringement. However, the courts have deter-
mined that this clause is not to be interpreted in this manner. 80
In the seminal case of Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell
the Supreme Court determined that this strict prohibition is
impermissible."' The Court felt that contracts are subordinate to
legitimate exercise of a state's police power. Recent Supreme
Court decisions have set forth a three-part test to evaluate the
constitutionality of these regulations under the Contracts Clause. 2
B. Constitutional Test Derived From Recent Supreme Court
Decisions
The Supreme Court's three-part test essentially analyzes a
Contracts Clause challenge in this manner: (1) Has there been a
substantial impairment of a contractual relationship? (2) Is the
impairment justfied by a legitimate state purpose? (3) Is the
" Amoco, 729 F.2d at 555.
71 Id. at 555.
79 U.S. CoNs'rT. art. 1, § 10 cl. 1.
8* Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
81 Id. at 428.
See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983); Energy Reserves Group,
Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983); El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S.
497, reh'g denied, 380 U.S. 926 (1965).
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impairment based upon reasonable conditions justifying the im-
position of the regulation?8 3 A minimal alteration of a contrac-
tual relationship will end the inquiry, but a substantial impairment
requires the Court to examine the nature and purpose of the
state regulation.8 To determine substantiality the Court exam-
ines the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties to
ascertain whether there is any restriction on the expected con-
tractual gain.
85
Retroactive application of surface damage statutes can sub-
stantially impair contracts entered into prior to the enactment
of the legislation. Mineral developers who paid for their interest
when they entered into the contract obviously did not expect to
be hit with costs for surface damages imposed on a strict liability
basis. Imposing liability where there has been a reasonable use
of the surface by the mineral developer lessens the expected gain
from the grant of the right to the mineral estate. Thus, the
Contract Clause inquiry cannot end at this point. Nevertheless,
the Murphy court ruled that because of the compensation already
required by the lease and possible damages for negligence, the
additional liability does not substantially impair those con-
tracts. 7
C. Cloud Disregarded Legislative Intent
The majority- in Cloud disregarded the Contracts Clause
challenge after determining that the statute was consistent with
the promotion of a legitimate state interest. 88 Yet, the dissent
pointed out the statute reads that "[n]othing [in the statute] shall
" Ross v. City of Berkeley, 655 F. Supp. 820, 827 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (The court
construed recent Supreme Court opinions to set forth this three-part test to be applied
to an attack under the Contracts Clause).
" Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978) (holding that
Minnesota's Private Pension Benefits Protection Act was unconstitutional because it
impaired existing contracts, and the regulation based on the state's police power was
not substantially related to the achievement of the intended purpose).
" Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 411.
" Garris v. Hanover Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 1001, 1004 (4th Cir. 1980) (determining
that a South Carolina statute prohibiting the wrongful cancellation of insurance contracts
operated retroactively and violated the Contracts Clause).
"7 Murphy, 729 F.2d at 557-58.
0 Cloud, 766 P.2d at 1349.
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be construed to impair existing contractual rights... ."19 Ap-
parently, the Oklahoma legislators intended to apply the statute °
prospectively.
D. Federal Constitution Does Not Prohibit Retroactivity
The United States Constitution does not require a statute to
operate prospectively. Neither does the Constitution prohibit
retrospective legislation; a statute is not invalid merely because
it is applied retroactively. 9 "It is well settled that an act of the
legislature may, as an exercise of the police power, have the
effect of altering or even negating the terms of a contract."'
92
The Supreme Court clearly enunciated this policy in United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey." The Supreme Court held that
"[tihe States must possess broad power to adopt general regu-
latory measures without being concerned that private contracts
will be impaired, or even destroyed, as a result" of such legis-
lation.' 4 The Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws
only applies to criminal statutes where there is punishment or
civil statutes which are penal in nature."6
Surface damage statutes intend to promote a legitimate state
purpose. However, courts must still determine if the legislation
is of a character appropriate to justify an impairment of a
contractual obligation. 6 In Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. v. Useryv
Id. at 1353 (Summers, J., dissenting) (quoting the Oklahoma statute).
* OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 318.2-318.9 (Supp. 1983).
91 League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156,-161 (1902) (clearly enunciating that simply
because a statute operates retroactively it is not automatically repugnant to the Federal
Constitution).
Dycus, Legislative Clarification of the Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral
Owners, 33 VAND. L. Rzv. 871, 910 (1980).
0 431 U.S. 1 (1976) (involving a New Jersey statute which retroactively repealed
a 1962 covenant between New Jersey and New York which limited the ability of the
Port Authority of New Jersey-New York to subsidize rail passenger transportation from
revenues and reserves pledged as security for consolidated bonds issued by the Port
Authority).
" Id. at 22.
" Dycus, supra note 92, at 908.
" Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 412.
'7 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (Coal mine operators attacked the constitutionality of black
lung benefit provisions of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. The Court
determined that the Due Process Clause posed no bar to the requirement of compensation
for a former miner's death or disability due to pneumoconiosis, caused by breathing
coal dust).
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the Supreme Court stated there is a presumption of constitu-
tionality regarding each legislative act, even if the act adjusts
burdens and benefits of economic life. To prove a particular act
is unconstitutional, the complainant must prove that the legis-
lators acted arbitrarily and irrationally in passing such legisla-
tion.9
8
Opponents of surface damage statutes have not set forth
evidence that legislators acted irrationally in enacting those sta-
tutes. The lobbying of various environmental and agricultural
factions may have influenced legislators to pass surface damage
statutes. However, the courts are not superlegislators willing to
strike down legislation where there is significant reason for such
legislation and a valid state purpose is to be achieved through
its enactment.9
In Manigualt v. Springs'0° the Supreme Court sustained the
right to enact legislation which operates retroactively as long as
it is accomplished through the police power. The Court stated:
[T]he interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of con-
tracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers
as are vested in it for the promotion of the common will, or
are necessary for the the good of the public, though contracts
previously entered into between individuals may thereby be
affected.' 0'
Legislators must decide whether the statute will be applied
retroactively or only prospectively. Regardless, they may rely on
precedential support which indicates that retroactive application
is constitutional. Adoption of the Model Act'02 may provide
uniformity in statutes passed in- the future. Similarly written
statutes will permit a decision on the constitutionality of one
statute to serve as precedent in future constitutional challenges
to statutes in other jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION
After the National Conference of Commissioners approves
the final draft of a Model Surface Use and Damages Act, states
" Id. at 15.
" Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 412-13 (stating that courts will pay much
deference to the legislators in their determination of what constitutes a legitimate state
interest).
-- 199 U.S. 473 (1905).
10, Id. at 480.
Im Act, supra note 3.
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may wish to enact surface damages statutes based on the Act. 3
In particular, those states enacting dormant mineral statutes'0
may seek to enact surface damage statutes to further the purpose
of keeping property available to beneficial development. Dor-
mant mineral statutes faced their own constitutional challenges,
and these attacks produced divided results. However, in Texaco,
Inc. v. Short'05 the Supreme Court decided that the Indiana
dormant minerals statute did not violate either the Taking Clause
or the Contracts Clause. This decision is supportive of the con-
stitutionality of surface damage statutes and provides some as-
surance to states considering enacting those statutes.
Surface damage statutes applied prospectively do not present
a Contracts Clause problem. However, statutes applied retroac-
tively continue to present problems that ensure continued liti-
gation to resolve constitutional challenges. The Takings Clause
challenge may not create a problem if there is an acknowledged
legitimate state purpose which is reasonable on its face. But
assessing damages based on strict liability may spawn questions
as to the statutes' constitutionality. Legislators may avoid these
attacks by abrogating the strict liability aspect of the damage
provision. Legislators may define damages as payment for the
reasonable use of the surface estate and a part of the broad
obligation to accommodate the lessor's uses. Alternatively, leg-
islators may determine that payment is merely a codification of
the "custom" in the industry.1°6 Perhaps these alternatives are
103 Id.
'04 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 712.01-.10 (West 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168 (1988 &
Supp 1989); ILL. Am. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, para. 9201 to 9217 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989);
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11 -1 to 8 (Burns 1984 & Supp. 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. § 353.460-
.470 (Mich. 1983); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1162(1) to (4) (Callaghan Supp. 1984); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 93.52, 93.55, 73.58 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990); NEB. REv. STAT. § 57-228
to 231 (1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-42.1 to .9 (1983 and Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 38-18.1 (1987 & Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT § 517.170, 517.180 (1989); S.D. Cornp.
LAws ANN. § 43-30-8.1 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 55-153 to 155 (1986 & Supp. 1989);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 706.055 to .057 (West 1981 & Supp. 1989) (These statutes extinguish
mineral interests if they have not been exercised within a specified period or if the lessee
has not filed a statement of claim with the county therein).
,- 454 U.S. 516 (1981) (holding that the Indiana Dormant Minerals statute was
enacted within the state's police power. The state has the power to enact this type of
statute and did not apply it arbitrarily. The Court added that each action required to
avoid abandonment of a mineral interest furthers the legitimate state goal of encouraging
mineral interest owners to develop such interest. It also furthered the State goal of
collecting property taxes).
"' Lowe, supra note 49, at § 20.02(l)(b).
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legal fiction, but they may help avoid future disputes since the
impositon of strict liability for surface damage would no longer
be an issue.
Finally, the respective courts' decisions in Cioud"07 and
Murphy'm did not end the constitutional inquiry into the validity
of surface damage statutes. A more careful examination applying
the tests promulgated by the United States Supreme Court de-
cisions may be required to end the constitutional challenges that
present and future surface damage statutes may encounter.
Stacey L. Graus
'01 Cloud, 766 P.2d at 1347.
,01 Murphy, 729 F.2d at 552.
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